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Goldberg: Evolutionary Biology Meets Determinism: Learning from Philosophy,

EVOLUTIONARY BIOLOGY MEETS DETERMINISM: LEARNING
FROM PHILOSOPHY, FREUD, AND SPINOZA
Steven Goldberg*
Through his writings, speeches, and work with the Society for
Evolutionary Analysis in Law and the Gruter Institute for Law and
Behavioral Research, Owen Jones has become the leading figure in the
field of evolutionary analysis in law. He is a founder of the field and the
most effective proponent of its importance. The Dunwody Distinguished
Lecture in Law adds yet another major contribution to Jones's imposing
body of work.
Under the circumstances, it may seem ungenerous to point to a major
area where Jones needs to do more if the implications and merits oflinking
behavioral biology and law are to become clear. But in the long run,
Jones's work and the discipline he champions will benefit if he and others
in the field turn their attention to the issues of determinism and free will
that accompany any causal account of human behavior.
Jones has not ignored these matters. As we will see, he has made
cautious and sensible comments on some limited aspects of the problem.
Moreover, Jones is under no obligation to become a philosopher, and it is
even sillier to suggest that he cannot write about the causes of human
behavior without solving problems relating to free will that have resisted
the work of countless scholars for thousands ofyears.' It would be helpful,
however, if Jones and other supporters of evolutionary analysis in law
gradually began to flesh out their views on determinism so that their
movement can be located in a broader philosophical context.
In the most general terms, the problem that will confront Jones is that,
on the one hand he wants evolutionary analysis to inform decisions about
how society should reach the goals it deems morally appropriate, yet, on
the other hand he may be committed to a world view in which morality
vanishes because free will vanishes.2 This is a familiar problem that has
accompanied many efforts to introduce the scientific study of human
behavior into law

* Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center. I would like to thank Louis
Michael Seidman and Silas Wasserstrom for their help.
I. One recent analysis of free will begins by citing the work of the Roman philosopher
Lucretius, who died in 55 B.C. SIMON BLACKBURN, THINK: A COMPELLING INTRODUCTION TO
PHILOSOPHY 81 (1999).
2. See id. at 82-83.

3.

See, e.g., MICHAEL S. MOORE, LAW AND PSYCHIATRY: RETHINKING THE RELATIONSHIP

351-52 (1984) (some psychiatrists believe their discipline eliminates the idea of moral
responsibility).
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Jones would like to avoid this problem by sharply separating "ought"
from "is." He argues that his approach "supplies no normative value to
behaviors or goals."4 Although legal systems "tend to reflect biobehavioral
predispositions [that] says precisely nothing about whether or not they
should." 5 Instead, behavioral biology helps us achieve goals "that have
already been set by independent processes of norm formation."6 Knowing
something about the biological basis of human behavior helps us choose
effective legal strategies for achieving those goals.
In addition, Jones emphasizes that when evolutionary biology does
shape the law, it does not do so in a mechanistic way. First of all,
evolutionary analysis depends on probabilities, and thus, the most it can
say is that some features of legal systems are highly likely, not inevitable.'
Behavioral dispositions in humans, Jones notes, "manifest themselves in
condition-dependent, subtle, variable, responsive, algorithmic, complex
ways."8 Indeed, evolutionary processes helped create "extraordinary human
capacities for rational analysis and decisionmaking," 9 capacities that
apparently enable us at times to overcome or shape the behavioral
tendencies favored by natural and sexual selection.
In short, Jones very much wants to avoid "imperialistic" claims for his
chosen discipline."0 As he puts it, "[o]ne need not have a theory of
everything in order to explain some things."" And he is particularly
concerned with one of the classic problems raised by overly ambitious
scientific claims: the simplistic notion that because biology causes
behavior, criminals should go free. Jones notes that such arguments lead
to "allergic responses."'" In an earlier article, he specifically rejected the
idea that "accused rapists should be allowed to raise biology in furtherance
ofexculpatory arguments, claiming that male evolved psychology absolves
them from guilt."' 3
Much of this is welcome. Any scholar who resists the notion that his
theories explain everything deserves our thanks. And the leap from a
theory of human behavior to a defense in a criminal trial is one that should

4. Owen D. Jones, Proprioception,Non-law, and Biolegal History, 53 FLA. L. REV. 831,
870-71 (2001) [hereinafter Jones, Proprioception].
5. id.
6. Id.
7. Id. at 871-72. On the implications for law ofthe statistical nature of evolutionary analysis,
see Steven Goldberg, Statistics, Law, andJustice, 39 JuRIMETRICS J. 255 (1999).
8. Jones, Proprioception,supra note 4, at 838.
9. Id.

10. Id. at 871.
11. Id. at 871-72.
12. Id. at 837.
13. Owen D. Jones, Sex, Culture, and the Biology of Rape: Toward Explanation and
Prevention, 87 CAL. L. REv. 827, 910-11 (1999) [hereinafter Jones, Biology ofRape].
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not be taken lightly.
But Jones's approach also leaves some very basic matters unclear. The
fundamental problem arises in the context of norms, that is, the question
of morality, of what we ought to do. As we have seen, Jones maintains that
he is concerned with a "descriptive" study of evolutionary biology which
"says precisely nothing" about norms, which are set by "independent
processes." 4 But the creation ofnorms is, in Jones's view, not entirely free
of evolutionary influences. Indeed, "the normative content of legal systems
will, all over the globe, tend to reflect the behavioral biology of speciestypical emotions, even as the details of those legal systems will inevitably
vary in many particulars.""lS Jones believes, for example, that rape is
wrong, and he also believes that our opposition to rape stems in large part
from natural selection. 6 Of course, evolution does not explain everything
about norms; there is "ample
room for cultural variation, random variation,
17
accident."'
historical
and
But is that enough to rescue norms? The starting point for many
discussions of morality is that for people to be held morally responsible
they must have free will. To put it another way, if determinism is true, that
is, if human choices are the result of antecedent causes, then morality is
impossible. 8 This problem is bigger than it may seem. You cannot rescue
free will by noting that the causes of human behavior include unpredictable
random factors, such as the quantum behavior of subatomic particles. If my
actions are caused by chance, that is very different from saying that they
are caused by free choice. 9 Nor can free will be rescued by saying that
human behavior is caused by multiple factors. Thus, the fact that Jones
does not attribute all human behavior to evolutionary biology does not take
determinism offthe table. If my choices are caused by subatomic particles,
the environment, the weather, my upbringing, and evolutionary biology,
those choices, however impossible to predict or understand, are still not
free, and it will be difficult to hold me morally accountable for them.2"
Finally, the existence of human reason does not rule out determinism. The
factors I consider in making a rational choice, the weight I give to them,
and my reasoning faculties themselves can all be the result of earlier

14. Jones, Proprioception,supra note 4, at 870.
15. Id. at 861-62.
16. Id. at 862-63; see also Jones, Biology ofRape, supranote 13, at 829-37.
17. Jones, Proprioception,supra note 4, at 862.
18. See Michael S. Moore, Causation and the Excuses, 73 CAL. L. REv. 1091, 1111-12
(1985) (discussing H. Hart).
19. BLACKBURN, supranote 1, at 84.
20. Indeed, this remains true even if we are ignorant of some of the many causes of human
behavior, just so long as we believe that the behavior is, in fact, caused. Moore, supra note 18, at

1119.

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2001

3

Florida Law Review, Vol. 53, Iss. 5 [2001], Art. 3
FLORIDA LAWREVIEW

[Vol. 53

21

causes.

Jones does not at present take a clear position on whether all human
behavior is the result of antecedent causes. That is neither surprising nor
distressing; determinism is not the subject of his Article. But there is
enough in Jones's work to raise the issue and to suggest where he might
stand. I think it is a fair guess that Jones supports a rather thoroughly
materialistic view of human behavior, and thus will have to do some work
to explain how people can be held morally accountable. Consider Figure
13 in his Article, where humans are shown to be the product of physical,
chemical, and biological processes.22 There are alternate accounts. For
example, some religions view humans as being created by God, and given
free will as part of that creation.23 But neither God nor religion makes it
into Figure 13; if they are included in the bracketed [others], then, like law,
they are a creation of humans rather than the other way around.
I suspect Jones believes that our moral values are the product of causes,
not of free choice. The causes extend beyond evolutionary biology, but
they are causes nonetheless. This would hardly be a surprising belief for an
individual in our society, particularly one so attracted to science. It is not
as though positing a role for free will solves the problem of human choice.
If humans have free will, how does that will make its views felt in the
physical brain? Through what mysterious force does it cause chemicals to
react and nerves to twitch? Dualism is largely in retreat among elites in our
culture, in large part because it operates outside of the realm of modem
science."
Indeed, from this point of view, one of the most remarkable items in
Jones's piece is his passing reference to the view that the study of
behavioral biology and law leaves "ample room for variation and for free
will."25 If by free will Jones really means something that is outside of the
world of causation yet capable of influencing that world, then dualism has
an important new recruit. Perhaps by using the term free will here, Jones
means something different. He may just mean "not caused by evolutionary
biology and difficult to predict," which leaves determinism in place.26 Or

21. In fact, it is sometimes argued that only our ignorance of reasons creates the feeling of
free will; if we acted based solely on reason in an effort to achieve our goals we would lack free
will. EDWARD 0. WILSON, CONSILIENCE: THE UNITY OF KNOWLEDGE 119 (1998).
22. Jones, Proprioception,supra note 4, at 870.
23. On the Catholic teaching that God has given humanity freewill, see Robert W. Lannan,
Catholic Tradition, and the New Catholic Theology and Social Teaching on the Environment, 39
CATH.LAW. 353, 373 (2000).
24. See BLACKBURN, supra note 1,at 88-90; see also Steven Goldberg, GenePatentsandthe
Death ofDualism, 5 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 25, 36-37 (1996).
25. Jones, Proprioception,supra note 4, at 867.
26. See Moore, supranote 18, at 1119. Moreover, it is difficult to assert that we are partly
determined and partly free; to many this is like saying someone is "partly pregnant." Id. at 1116.
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by "free will" he may mean the feeling or sensation of free will that all
humans apparently have. We feel like we are using our reason and making
free choices, even if the way our reason operates and the choices we make
are completely the result of antecedent causes. This type of free will is also
completely consistent with determinism. Indeed, some believe it may be
the result of evolutionary forces. E. 0. Wilson, for example, has written
that we have "the illusion of free will. . . . And that is a fortunate
circumstance. Confidence in free will is biologically adaptive. Without it
'
the mind, imprisoned by fatalism, would slow and deteriorate."27
Jones may benefit from considering earlier efforts to analyze
systematically the problem of free will. Legal scholars who specialize in
the relationship between determinism and law have identified several
typical reactions to the situation that confronts Jones." Four of these wellknown philosophical categories appear particularly relevant here.
The first possible reaction to a scientific, causal theory that seems to
bear on legal issues is not to dispute determinism but rather to assert that
the law, unlike science, simply assumes the freedom of the will. Thus,
judges confronted with psychiatric explanations of human behavior
sometimes assert that human autonomy is a "necessary postulate" of law.29
Justice Cardozo provided a classic statement of this view in rejecting an
argument that a taxing program was coercive:
[T]o hold that motive or temptation is equivalent to coercion
is to plunge the law in endless difficulties. The outcome of
such a doctrine is the acceptance of a philosophical
determinism by which choice becomes impossible. Till now
the law has been guided by a robust common sense which
assumes the freedom of the will as a working hypothesis in
the solution of its problems.3"
This approach, which Michael S. Moore has termed "reconciliation by

fiat,"31 is popular with lawyers and judges who want to go about their

Finally, for some philosophers free will is even more elusive because it is inconsistent not only with
determinism but with indeterminism. Peter van Inwagen, Free Will Remains a Mystery, in
PHILOSOPHICAL PERSPECTIVES 14: ACTION AND FREEDOM 1, 10 (James E. Tomberlin ed., 2000)
[hereinafter PHILOSOPHICAL PERSPECTIVES].
27. WILSON, supra note 21, at 119-20.
28. See, e.g., MOORE, supra note 3, at 350-65; Stephen J. Morse, The Moral Metaphysics of
Causationand Results, 88 CAL. L. REV. 879, 882-89 (2000); Michael Corrado, Addiction and
Causation,37 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 913, 917-19 (2000); Rachel J. Littman, Adequate Provocation,
IndividualResponsibility, and the Deconstruction ofFree Will, 60 ALB. L. REv. 1127, 1131-39

(1997).
29. MOORE, supra note 3, at 353 (citing Judge Levin).
30. Steward Mach. Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548, 589-90 (1937).
31. MOORE, supranote 3, at 353. Moore regards this as an unacceptable approach for ajust
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business without becoming bogged down in philosophical debate. I would
be surprised if it were adequate in the long run for a scholar like Jones,
who is vitally concerned with the causes of human behavior and the
intersection of those causes with the law.
A second approach is to reject, on the merits, the notion that human
32
choices are determined. This view is typically called libertarianism.
Libertarians accept that humans may be predisposed to take certain actions
by evolution, the environment, and other causes outside of their control,
but they insist that, in the end, individuals can choose to follow or not
follow these tendencies.33 This freedom to choose, according to
libertarians, is central to moral responsibility. Science, in their view, has
not demonstrated that human choices are the result of antecedent causes
alone. Libertarianism, whether it goes by that name or not, is popular with
individuals who, for religious or other reasons, are convinced that human
choices are outside the scientific model that seems to govern so much else
in the world. Whether or not they are formally dualists, who believe that
the soul is distinct from the body, they believe that human actions have a
free and morally-laden quality. Libertarianism is undoubtedly widespread;
it has even been suggested that it is the view that "philosophers hold when
' It may be a view that Jones will come to accept.
they are not at work."34
But, as suggested earlier, that would be a somewhat surprising result.
Evolutionary analysis in law seems consistent with a materialistic view of
nature, including the idea that human brains and minds are entirely part of
the natural world. In particular, modem advances in neural science make
it unlikely that someone with Jones's point of view would regard human
choice as outside the realm of causal science.35
The third possible reaction to the intersection of causation and law is
often called hard determinism or incompatibilism. In this view, all human
actions have a cause, and thus, no one is morally responsible for
anything. 6 Some students of human behavior, including some
psychiatrists, have supported this view, as have some philosophers.37 For
most people, however, it is an unpleasant and counterintuitive notion and
one that seems to undercut our usual sense of the relevance of the law.
Finally, there is compatibilism, or as it is sometimes called, soft

legal system. Id.
32. Corrado, supranote 28, at 917; Littman, supranote 28, at 1138-39.
33. Littman, supranote 28, at 1138-39.
34. Corrado, supranote 28, at 918.
35. Id
36. Morse, supra note 28, at 882; Littman, supra note 28, at 1137.
37. MOORE, supra note 3,at352; seealso Ted A. Warfield, CausalDeterminismandHuman
Freedom Are Incompatible: A New Argument for Incompatibilism, in PHILOSOPHICAL
PERSPECTIVES, supra note 26, at 167.
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determinism."8 Compatibilists believe that moral responsibility is
consistent with the idea that human actions are caused. In other words,
determinism and human responsibility can coexist.39 Under one
formulation of this view, human action is not uncaused, but when it is
guided by reason it is fair to hold an individual responsible.4" Moral and
legal rules are meaningful because they provide an individual good reasons
for taking action.4 Moral responsibility in this view does require that a
human agent act intentionally rather than under compulsion from external
forces that overcome his or her desires. But moral responsibility is
compatible with the notion that an individual's desires are themselves the
result of antecedent causes.42
Compatibilism comes in many varieties, and it has many critics,
including those who believe it is little more than a play on words.43 On the
other hand, no approach in this area is without opponents, and
compatibilism appears to be the most widely supported view among moral
philosophers today.44
I believe that in the future, Jones and other practitioners of evolutionary
analysis in law will gradually locate themselves somewhere along this
spectrum of approaches to determinism and law. Hard determinism has an
obvious appeal to those with a scientific bent, but it is hard to give up the
language and attitudes associated with choice and morality. Yet simply
positing free will, as Cardozo did, may not be satisfying either. My guess
is that for most evolutionary analysts either libertarianism or some form of
compatibilism will have the most appeal. The former allows evolutionary
and other causal influences on human behavior, but it preserves freedom
and morality by finding a sphere ofhuman action that operates completely
outside of the causal world. The latter, which combines causation and
moral responsibility, may be particularly attractive for some.
Another way to approach this problem is to look not at current

38. MOORE, supra note 3, at 360-65.
39. Id.
40. Morse, supra note 28, at 886. Morse identifies several other conditions necessary for a
compatibilist to hold an individual responsible, such as compliance with or breach of a moral
obligation. Id

41. Id.
42. Littman, supra note 28, at 1134-35.
43. On various approaches to soft determinism (compatibilism), see id. at 1135 n.32. For a
criticism of compatibilism, see Warfield, supranote 37, at 167. In an earlier article, Jones cites an
article by Deborah Denno, which appears skeptical of compatibilism, although Jones does not
discuss this aspect of the Denno article. See Jones, Biology of Rape, supra note 13, at 911 n.288;
see also Deborah W. Denno, Human Biology and Criminal Responsibility: Free Will or Free
Ride?, 137 U. PA. L. REv. 615, 663 (1988) ("Moore's [compatibilism] appears to be more of a
variation on the theme of degree determinism than any 'new' theory of behavior.").
44. Morse, supranote 28, at 886; Warfield, supra note 37, at 168.
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philosophical categories but at historical experience. When we consider
thinkers such as Freud and Spinoza, who strongly supported causal theories
of human behavior, we find an unwillingness to completely abandon ideas
of choice, freedom, and morality. Whatever philosophical camp they might
now be put in, the experience of Freud and Spinoza suggests that even the
strongest proponents of the relevance of scientific determinism to human
action seek to participate in debate over what is best for individuals and for
human society.
Freud's work and its relation to law is similar in some ways to
evolutionary biology and law. Although we sometimes think of Freudian
psychology in terms divorced from underlying human biology, that is at
best an incomplete picture.4" When Freud was a young man in the 1870's
he became an adherent of Darwinian ideas. As he wrote in his
autobiography, "the theories of Darwin, which were then of topical
interest, strongly attracted me, for they held out hopes of an extraordinary
advance in our understanding of the world ... ,46 In his first year of
medical school he took a course on "General Biology and Darwinism."
After graduation, he did laboratory science for a time, beginning with
research on the spinal cords of fish and concluding with neurological
studies on brain paralysis in children.4" Most importantly, Freud believed
that the unconscious, which in his view influenced so much of human
behavior, was something that we carry as an inheritance from the animal
world.4 9 Thus, it is not surprising that Ernest Jones's biography of Freud
refers to him as the "Darwin of the mind."50
Today, many believe that Freud's ideas are misguided and
unscientific.5 " But those ideas continue to have adherents, and in their
heyday, proponents of Freudian theory envisioned it playing a role quite
similar to the role Jones sees for evolutionary analysis. A 1967 legal
casebook, Psychoanalysis, Psychiatry, and Law, centered on
psychoanalytic theory because psychoanalysis "endeavors to construct a
systematic theory of human behavior" and because "each man as an

45. On the long-standing tension between "biological" and "psychological" views of Freud's
work, see FRANK J. SULLOWAY, FREUD, BIOLOGIST OF THE MIND: BEYOND THE PSYCHOANALYTIC

LEGEND 13 (1983). Although Sulloway emphasizes the biological underpinnings of Freud's work,
he does not deny the importance of psychology in that work. Id. at XV (preface to the paperback
edition).
46. Id. at 13.
47. Id. at 13-14.
48. HANS KONG, FREUD AND THE PROBLEM OF GOD 16 (Edward Quinn trans., 1990).

49. SULLOWAY, supranote 45, at 4.
50. Id.
51. See, e.g., David S. Caudill, The Anatomy in PropertyLaw: "It'sNot About Sex," Or Is
It?, 20 CARDOZO L. REv. 1695, 1700-01 (1999) (reviewing JEANNE LORRAINE SCHROEDER, TE
VESTAL AND THE FASCES: HEGEL, LACAN, PROPERTY, AND THE FEMININE (1988)).
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individual dealing with his reality... is, after all, the subject of both
psychoanalysis and law."52 One of the major legal areas where
psychoanalytic theory is used today is family law, an area where Jones
envisions a role for evolutionary analysis. 3
For our purposes, it is of no moment whether evolutionary analysis in
law will one day have more or less influence than psychoanalysis and law,
or whether it should. What we can say with confidence, however, is that,
just like the Freudians, Jones and his supporters will have to grapple with
the difficult relationship of determinism to law. In the end, Freud, like
most others who follow in Darwin's footsteps, took a scientific,
determinist view of human action. As Marcia Cavell puts it, "Freud
thought that science demanded causal determinism; and because of his
materialist convictions, he thought causal connections were incompatible
with choice."54 But Cavell goes on to point out that Freud's behavior as a
psychotherapist was, in fact, designed to help patients uncover and
understand their infantile wishes and perhaps overcome those wishes by
carrying out other desires." Similarly, Michael S. Moore notes that Freud
used non-intentional, deterministic language when he theorized about his
work, but used an intentional vocabulary when he talked to his patients.56
To Moore, a compatibilist, this can be understood so long as we realize
that determinism is consistent with individual responsibility.57 Moore
concludes that Freud's "insights about the unconscious do not... generally
require one to alter the legal view of persons as autonomous and rational
beings who may justly be held responsible .... ""
A similar picture emerges when we move back in time before Darwin
to the work of the seventeenth-century philosopher Baruch Spinoza.
Spinoza's work remains influential.59 His identification of God with
Nature, and his belief that Nature operates by rational, deterministic laws
make his thinking relevant to modem science.60 In 1929, Albert Einstein,
having received a cable asking, "Do you believe in God," replied: "I

52. JAY KATZ ET AL., PSYCHOANALYSIS, PSYCHIATRY AND LAW 3 (1967).

53. Jones has applied evolutionary analysis to family law in Owen D. Jones, Evolutionary
Analysis in Law: An IntroductionandApplicationto ChildAbuse, 75 N.C. L. REv. 1117 (1997).
Psychoanalysis forms the central framework for JOSEPH GOLDSTEIN et al., BEYOND THE BEST
INTERESTS OF THE CHILD (1973), the first in a series of important family law books. See Elizabeth
Stauderman, Tribute: Biography ofJoseph Goldstein, 19 YALE L. & POL'Y REv. 1, 1 (2000).
54. MARCIA CAVELL, THEPSYCHOANALYTIC MIND: FROM FREUD TO PHILOSOPHY 82 (1993).

55. Id.
56. MOORE, supra note 3, at 382.
57. Id. at 360-61.
58. Id. at 383.
59. Spinoza has been the subject of two recent full-scale biographies. See STEVENNADLER,
SPINOZA: A LIFE (1999); MARGARET GULLAN-WHUR, WITHIN REASON: A LIFE OF SPINOZA (1998).
60. GULLAN-WHUR, supra note 59, at 119-20.
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believe in Spinoza's God who reveals Himself in the orderly harmony of
what exists, not in a God who concerns Himself with fates and actions of
human beings."'"
To Einstein, the statistical nature of the quantum theory, which he
rejected, was inconsistent with Spinoza's philosophy. Other scientists
disagreed; indeed, in 1937 Einstein and Niels Bohr argued about whether
Spinoza would have accepted quantum physics.62
Spinoza extended his belief in scientific determinism to human
behavior. Rejecting Descartes's dualism, Spinoza argued that human
beings, including their minds, were entirely part of the natural order.63 He
wrote, "I shall discuss human actions and appetites just as if the inquiry
concerned lines, planes, or bodies.""6 And as with other parts ofnature, the
key to understanding human behavior was to understand antecedent causes:
"There is in the mind no absolute, i.e. no free, will, but the mind is
determined to will this or that by a cause, which is again65determined by
another, and that again by another, and so on to infinity.
This view of human behavior makes Spinoza's philosophy relevant to
legal issues in much the same way that Freudian theory and evolutionary
biology are relevant. For example, Margaret Gullan-Whur, in a recent
biography of Spinoza, says that his "theory of the interrelatedness within
nature of all natural phenomena, physical and mental" makes his work
relevant to a variety of issues including the "rights of parents and children
foundations and legitimate social benefits of
... [and] the anthropological
66
marriage....
Moreover, Spinoza confronted the same issue that we have seen with
psychoanalysis and evolutionary biology: if human behavior results from
antecedent causes, how can we talk about human responsibility? 67 Spinoza,
after all, did not limit himself to a belief in deterministic natural laws. He
also offered his views on the proper way for people to live their lives. He
valued the exercise of reason in personal life, and he offered ideas about.
the proper form of political organization, including early arguments in
favor of democracy."

61. Einstein Believes in "Spinoza's God4 " N.Y. TiMES, Apr. 25, 1929, at 60.
62. Niels Bohr, Discussion With Einstein on EpistemologicalProblems in Atomic Physics,
in ALBERT EINSTEIN: PHILOSOPHER-SCIENTIST 201, 236-37 (Paul Arthur Schilpp ed., 1959).
63. STUART HAMPSHIRE, SPINOZA 61-62, 121 (1973 ed.).
64. SPINOZA, ETHics 164 (G.H.R. Parkinson ed., trans., 2000); see also NADLER, supra note
59, at 238.
65. SPINOZA, supra note 64, at 155.
66. GULLAN-WHUR, supra note 59, at 314-15.
67. HAMPSHIRE, supra note 63, at 149-50.
68. I discuss some of Spinoza's moral and political views in Steven Goldberg, Antonin
Scalia,Baruch Spinoza, and the RelationshipBetween Church andState, 23 CARDOZO L. REV.
(forthcoming 2001).
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Scholars have long addressed the relationship between determinism and
freedom in Spinoza's writings. Most have agreed with Stuart Hampshire
that Spinoza developed an "account of freedom of mind which he
considered compatible with the thesis of determinism." 69 As Jon Wetlesen
puts it, Spinoza believed that a person is determined, yet free in so far as
his striving is determined from within himself.7" However modem
philosophers might categorize his views on these matters, it is clear that
Spinoza talked about causation while also talking about situations where
people could be held responsible for their thoughts and actions.7
In sum, the application of evolutionary analysis to law that Jones
envisions need not pose insurmountable philosophical problems. Jones
wants to employ an essentially naturalistic view of human behavior
without rejecting the idea that we can talk sensibly about human
responsibility and morality. Some modem philosophical approaches,
particularly compatibilism, support this possibility, as do some views of
the work of determinists such as Freud and Spinoza. The point is not that
Jones must immediately choose a school of philosophy or commit himself
to a particular form of words to be used when issues of free will and
determinism arise. It is rather that Jones should work with an awareness of
these matters, and should gradually evolve a workable approach to the
inevitable tensions that arise when law intersects with deterministic
science.
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